As pointed out in my briefs to the Vermont Supreme Court, even if the 2004 registration of the Michigan decree was proper (and properly noticed on me), and I have thus "waived" the right to challenge the registration of the Michigan decree, as noted in my brief and the very case cited by my ex wife's de facto counsel in their brief, (see Bowman v Bowman 917 N.Y.S.2d3 79, 82 A.D.3d 144, 146 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 2011), "just because a court may have jurisdiction over a foreign decree does not mean it has jurisdiction to modify it." Bowman, supra (As the court even alludes to in its Jan. 10, 2014 order, see here at par. 31).
By the same logic, neither does proper registration automatically mean the Vermont court need not procure proper service and notice on father in order to effect personal jurisdiction over me for purposes of modifying the support order.
On this point Vermont law is well settled (as pointed out at length in my briefs, but entirely ignored by the Court in its Jan. 10, 2014 ruling).
As noted last time, the Superior court in its Aug 1, 2012 order, as well as settled precedents of the honorable Vermont Supreme Court clearly have made a distinction between matters which affect "status" and actions and orders of a State court which effect the property rights of individuals.
I argue this is the very purpose of Rule 5(a)'s provision that for "new or additional claims" a plaintiff must effect service in conformance with the more rigorous requirements of V.R.F.P. 4 requring service by Sheriff or certified mail with return receipt or an initial attempt at such service followed by service by regular mail with an affidavit showing the due diligence of plaintiffs to comply with the Rules' and Vermont's settled public policy favoring the "best possible service." (See Aiken v. Mallory, In re R.W., other cites in my posted briefs).
Therefore, it is irrelevant if the 2004 registration of the Michigan decree was proper or not, or I was properly served notice of the registration at that time.
Indeed, if proper service was not required based on the 2004 "service" of the registration of the Michigan decree, and "new or additional claims" effecting the property rights of a defendant don't require service in strict conformance to any Rule of Civil or Family procedure, then why did the Supreme Court not uphold Appellees' lack of proper service in 2010 as Appellees then urged it to? (An argument the high court completely ignores in its Jan. 10, 2014 order!)
Therefore, as pointed out last post, even if the 2004 registration was proper, that still doesn't serve as "double duty" as proper notice of a modification action four years later! (As the Supreme Court's own Jan. 10, 2014 order seems to concede in upholding the rulings of the trial court that I "must have known" of my ex's desire to "modify" support due to our last five years of legal wrangling!)
To the contrary, as I point out exhaustively in my Motion for Rehearing and brief, the law doesn't say service can be assumed proper, and jurisdiction attaches merely if you "knew or should have known" of an attempted modification, (else why even have Rules of Procedure?!) Rather, the Rules must be adhered to for the protection of everyone and the integrity of the process itself in order to insure the constitutional interests at stake are not gradually eviscerated.
However, the Court seems to focus on "minimum contacts" and a cramped view of the important policy at the core of the due process right to proper notice to the derogation of proper service under the Rules, (and with complete disregard to the precedents thereon!)
Why this is is indeed a curious matter, and one I shall delve into in future posts. jp
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